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Imperial	Ethiopia:	
Conquest	and	the	Case	of	National	Articulation	
	
By:	Hawi	Tilahune	
	
Introduction			
Much	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 state-building	 draws	 inspiration	 from	 the	 American	 sociologist	
Charles	 Tilly’s	 Bellicist	 perspective	 (Centeno	 2002;	 Thies	 2005).	 The	 bellicist	 account	 or	 the	
predatory	 theory	 speaks	 to	 the	 earlier	 European	 state-formation.	 In	 Tilly’s	 renowned	 aphorism:	
“War	made	the	state,	and	the	state	made	war”	(quoted	in	Taylor	and	Botea	2008:	27).	Based	on	an	
extensive	 and	 comprehensive	 historical	 analysis	 of	 modern	 European	 states,	 the	 Bellicist	
perspective	 presents	 war	 as	 the	 primary	 and	 central	 stimulus	 to	 building	 a	 centralized	 state	
apparatus	 (Thies	2009:	625).	The	defining	 factor	 for	 state-building	 is	 the	 state’s	 capacity	 to	wage	
war	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 penetrate	 society	 to	 extract	 revenues	 and	 resources.	More	 precisely,	 state	
building	is	a	process	by	which	states	develop	the	capacity	to	control,	extract	and	regulate	society	
while	commanding	a	level	of	legitimacy.	The	process	of	extraction	is	needed	in	order	to	build	the	
capacity	of	the	state	and	to	develop	its	administrative	institutions	(Kisangani	2014:	2).	In	addition,	
the	collection	of	revenues	and	the	building	of	a	centralized	state	infrastructure	are	assumed	to	also	
facilitate	a	national	identity	and	“other	informal	and	formal	features	of	modern	states”	(Thies	2009:	
625).			
As	part	of	this	effort	to	consolidate	their	authority,	“wielders	of	coercion”	(Leander	2004:	4)	
become	responsible	for	what	Tilly	and	other	bellicist	scholars	identify	as	war-making	(eliminating	
or	 neutralizing	 external	 enemies),	 state-making	 (eliminating	 or	 neutralizing	 internal	 enemies),	
protection	 (securing	 allies	 internally)	 and	 extraction	 (securing	 the	means	 to	 facilitate	 the	 above-
mentioned	processes	 through	capital	accumulation)	 (Tilly	 1985:	 181).	These	 interrelated	processes	
yield	 organizational	 features	 that	 constitute	 the	 modern	 characteristics	 of	 a	 centralized	 nation-
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state.	 	In	 view	 of	 Tilly’s	 predatory	 theory,	 I	 argue	 that	 two	 factors	 precipitated	 the	 nation-state	
articulation	process	of	Ethiopia:	European	imperialism	in	the	Horn	and	Abyssinian	conquest	of	the	
periphery.	Further	adding	to	the	literature,	I	also	draw	attention	to	the	cultural	conditions	and	the	
social	 “storytelling”	 that	 underlines	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 state-consolidation.	 First,	 I	 will	
evaluate	the	bellicist	account	and	the	processes	that	are	central	in	defining	state-formation.	Before	
assessing	 the	 relevance	of	Tilly’s	bellicist	account,	 I	will	provide	 justification	 for	my	emphasis	on	
the	study	of	war	and	the	field	of	cultural	political	economy	in	the	second	and	third	sections.	These	
sections	provide	the	conceptual	tools	to	further	highlight	the	relevance	of	the	bellicist	account	to	
Ethiopia.	My	fourth	section	seeks	to	justify	the	study	of	war,	relevant	in	the	Bellicist	account	and	
particularly,	in	the	state	formation	processes	of	Ethiopia.	To	evaluate	these	assertions,	I	locate	the	
historical	frontier	of	Ethiopia	during	the	reign	of	Menelik	II1	(1889-1913).	Followed	by	the	discussion	
on	the	case	study,	I	will	conclude	with	important	insights	and	further	implications	of	this	research.		
Understanding	the	Bellicist	Perspective		
	
The	bellicist	account,	otherwise	known	as	the	predatory	theory,	documents	early	European	
state-formation.	Based	on	an	extensive	historical	analysis	of	modern	European	states,	the	bellicist	
perspective	reinstates	war	as	the	central	means	of	extraction,	critical	in	building	a	centralized	state	
apparatus	(Thies	2009:	625).		In	other	words,	the	predatory	theory	treats	war	as	the	primary	vehicle	
for	 institutional	 development,	 in	 which	 the	 need	 to	 extract	 resources	 necessitates	 the	
establishment	of	 centralized	 state	 institutions.	The	defining	 factor	 of	 state-building	 is	 the	 state’s	
ability	to	penetrate	society	to	capital.	These	assets	are	crucial	in	order	to	build	the	capacity	of	the	
state	and	to	develop	its	administrative	institutions	(Kisangani	2014:	2).	Tilly	analogizes	this	process	
of	Western	European	 state-formation	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 and	 seventeenth	 century	 to	 an	 “organized																																																									
1Menelik	II	is	renowned	as	the	founding	father	of	modern	Ethiopia	(Crummey	2000:	215).	He	was	the	King	of	Shewa		
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crime”	 (Tilly	 1985)	 involving	 three	 interrelated	 processes:	 war-making,	 extraction	 and	 capital	
accumulation	(Tilly	1985:	172).			
Tilly	 uses	 the	 analogy	 of	 criminal	 protection	 rackets	 to	 explain	 the	 dynamics	 of	 early-
modern	European	state	 formation.	Through	the	racketeering	analogy,	he	demonstrates	 that	state	
leaders,	 like	 criminal	 syndicates,	 create	 threats	 that	 only	 they	 can	 mitigate—for	 a	 price.	 The	
interdependent	processes	of	war-making	and	state-making	thereby	function	as	“protection	rackets”	
to	secure	power	 for	 the	state-builders	 (Tilly	 1985:	 169).	As	 the	state	sells	 security	 in	exchange	 for	
revenues,	 it	develops	organized	means	for	coercive	extraction	and	protection.	Many	governments	
could	be	said	to	operate	as	racketeers	since	“the	repressive	and	extractive	activities	of	governments	
often	constitute	the	largest	current	threats	to	the	livelihoods	of	their	own	citizens”	(Tilly	1985:	171).	
Though	Tilly	is	drawing	parallels	between	organized	crime	racketeering	and	state-building,	rulers	
do	not	set	out	to	run	crime	syndicates.	Instead,	they	often	produce	danger	while	also	providing	a	
shield	against	it	(Tilly	1985:	171).		
As	 part	 of	 this	 effort	 to	 consolidate	 authority,	 “wielders	 of	 coercion”	 (Leander	 2004:	 4)	
become	responsible	for	what	Tilly	and	other	bellicist	scholars	identify	as	war-making,	state-making,	
protection	 and	 extraction	 (Tilly	 1985:	 181).	 These	 interrelated	 processes	 yield	 organizational	
features,	which	constitute	the	modern	characteristics	of	a	centralized	nation-state.	It	 is	critical	to	
note	 that	 power	holders	 did	not	 engage	 in	 the	war-making,	 extraction	 and	 capital	 accumulation	
processes	to	construct	the	nation-state;	instead,	nation-states	became	the	by-products	of	securing	
power	and	exercising	authority	in	expanded	territories	through	war-making.			
War-making,	which	 involves	 establishing	 a	monopoly	over	 the	means	of	 coercion	 to	 fight	
against	 outside	 intruders	 or	 enemies,	 calls	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 standing	 army	 and	 related	
mechanisms	 and	 organizations	 (Tilly	 1985:	 181).	 Waging	 war	 is	 a	 costly	 and	 requires	 great	
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investment	of	human	and	 financial	capital.	 In	order	 to	secure	 resources	 for	war,	European	rulers	
had	to	locate	and	secure	capital	through	outright	conquest,	selling	assets	or	forcefully	dispossessing	
those	 having	 command	 over	 capital	 (Tilly	 1985:	 172).	What	 this	 produced	 in	 the	 long-term	 was	
organized	systems	that	ensured	“regular	access	to	capitalists	who	could	supply	and	arrange	credit”	
and	 regular	 forms	of	 taxation	within	a	particular	 territory	 (Tilly	 1985:	 172).	Through	 this	process,	
state-builders	built	administrative	capacity	and	state	bureaucracies	that	allowed	them	to	map	their	
territories	and	gather	needed	information	for	capital	accumulation	(Robinson	2002:	512).	European	
rulers	often	provided	ways	to	protect	inside	supporters.	Institutions	such	as	courts	and	assemblies	
took	shape	in	the	processes	of	guaranteeing	demanded	protection	by	the	ruled	(Tilly	1985:	181).	The	
more	 costly	 the	 war-making	 activity,	 all	 other	 variables	 equal,	 “the	 greater	 the	 organizational	
residue”	(Tilly	1985:	181).		
Competition	 over	 territory	 and	 capital	 provided	 by	 war-making	 led	 to	 the	 unintended	
consequence	 of	 the	 state	 or	 the	 development	 of	 state-apparatus	 (Leander	 2004:	 4).	 Before	 the	
French	Revolution,	Tilly	notes	that	the	use	of	local	magnates	as	indirect	rulers	was	key	in	ensuring	
protection	 and	 governance	 among	 European	 provinces.	 These	 magnates	 “collaborated	 with	 the	
government	 without	 becoming	 officials	 in	 any	 strong	 sense	 of	 the	 term,	 had	 some	 access	 to	
government	backed	 force,	 and	exercised	wide	discretion	within	 their	own	 territories”	 (Tilly	 1985:	
174).	However,	the	state	magnates	also	were	potential	enemies	and	possible	allies	of	opposition	in	
the	region	(Tilly	1985:	174).	Thus,	the	use	of	indirect-rule	decreased	with	two	distinct	strategies:	(1)	
dispatching	 officials	 to	 local	 provinces	 and	 communities	 (2)	 Encouraging	 the	 build-up	 of	
subordinate	 police	 forces	 (Tilly	 1985:	 174).	 In	 the	 earlier	 European	 experience,	 supporters	 of	 the	
state,	 which	 carried	 out	 the	 protective	 and	 extractive	 processes	 for	 state	 consolidation,	 were	
generally	“landlords,	armed	retainers	of	the	monarch,	and	churchmen”	(Tilly	1985:	181).		
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In	addition	 to	building	 the	administrative	 capacity	 to	 secure	power	within	a	 territory,	 the	
process	of	state-building	entails	eliminating	or	neutralizing	enemies	inside	the	territory.	This	took	
the	 form	 of	 establishing	 surveillance	 systems	 and	 bureaucratic	 forms	 of	 guaranteeing	 control	
within	 the	 territory	 (Tilly	 1985:	 181).	 Emphasizing	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 processes	 of	 war-
making	and	state-making,	Sorenson	writes,	“Before	the	full	consolidation	of	state	power,	would-be	
rulers	 always	 had	 to	 think	 in	 terms	 of	 two-front	 battles,	 against	 ‘domestic’	 as	 well	 as	 against	
‘international’	opponents”	(Sorenson	2001:	346).	Developing	the	administrative	state	apparatus	was	
critical	in	protecting	given	territories	from	both	outside	intruders	as	well	as	inside	enemies.		
Tilly	 describes	 the	 protection	 that	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 wielders	 of	 coercion	 in	 the	 state-
building	process	 as	 a	double-edged	 protection.	Again,	 functioning	 as	 a	 racketeer,	 this	means	 that	
state	agents	produce	“both	the	danger	and,	at	a	price,	the	shield	against	[a	threat]”	(Tilly	1985:	171).	
Thus,	governments	can	“commonly	simulate,	stimulate,	or	even	fabricate	threats	of	external	war”	
and	create	protective	mechanism	to	 further	counter	opposition	(Tilly	 1985:	 171).	Protection	 in	the	
Tillyan	approach	involves	securing	allies	internally	and	providing	protection	for	“domestic	players	
that	support	their	rule”	(Kisangani	and	Pickering	2014:	2).	Protection	of	allies	also	means	repression	
of	rivalries	in	the	state	(Taylor	and	Botea	2008:	29).		
A	 state	 that	 is	 able	 to	 secure	 internal	 supporters	 and	 eliminate	opposition	 strengthens	 its	
capacity	 to	 extract	 resources	 (Tilly	 1985:	 181).	 Extraction,	 the	 means	 by	 which	 the	 above	 three	
processes	take	place,	manifests	in	fiscal	policies	and	administrative	capacities	which	allow	agents	of	
states	to	penetrate	society	to	secure	human	and	material	capital	(Tilly	1985:	181,	Centeno	2003:	86).	
In	 the	narrative	of	 state-building	 in	Europe,	Tilly	claims	“mercantile	capitalism	and	state-making	
reinforced	each	other”	(Tilly	1985:	170).	To	facilitate	the	capital	accumulation	process,	rulers	of	the	
state	 have	 to	 manage	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 polity	 through	 concessions	 and	 negotiations:	
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“Extracting	financial	resources	requires	bargaining	with	those	controlling	these	resources”	(Leander	
2004:	 5).	 The	 process	 of	 extraction	 thereby	 yields	 notions	 of	 rights,	 citizenship,	 and	 legitimacy,	
which	are	critical	in	sustaining	strong	and	stable	state-society	relations.		
State-builders	also	have	to	provide	a	level	of	protection	in	order	to	secure	legitimacy	for	the	
process	 of	 extraction.	 Miguel	 Angel	 Centeno	 speaks	 further	 to	 the	 state's	 extractive	 power.	
Borrowing	the	term	from	Michael	Mann	(1988),	he	notes	that	growth	of	state	administration	and	
centralization	provides	the	state	with	infrastructural	power:	“the	capacity	to	penetrate	civil	society	
and	 to	 implement	 logistically	 political	 decisions	 throughout	 the	 realm”	 (Centeno	 2003:	 86).	This	
process	of	trade-off	between	rulers	and	the	ruled	also	creates	a	body	of	civil	servants	who	express	
their	demands	 to	 the	 state	and	play	a	 role	 in	building	 the	 state	 infrastructure	 (Leander	2004:	5).	
The	 process	 of	 penetration	 often	 takes	 different	 forms:	 “Extraction,	 for	 instance,	 ranges	 from	
outright	 plunder	 to	 regular	 tribute	 to	 bureaucratized	 taxation”	 (Tilly	 1985:	 181).	 	Successful	
processes	of	empire-building	or	state-building	offer	the	opportunity	to	capture	economies	of	scale.	
Although	most	significant	in	capturing	new	trade	and	finance	endeavors,	these	economies	of	scale	
also	 affect	 industrial	 production.	 In	 the	 European	 experience,	 centralized	 state	 taxation	 also	
channeled	 peasant	 production	 into	 the	 international	 market,	 further	 augmenting	 “the	
opportunities	 for	 trade	 creation	 and	 economic	 specialization”	 (Tilly	 1985:	 179).	 Therefore,	
mechanisms	 of	 mercantile	 capitalism	 that	 encouraged	 capital	 accumulation	 or	 extraction	 were	
intimately	linked	with	state	consolidation	(Tilly	1985:	170).	
To	 summarize,	 the	 European	 experience	 shows	 a	 great	 lord	 engaging	 in	 effective	 war-
making	to	become	dominant	in	a	given	territory.	War-making	entails	securing	human	and	material	
capital.		This	leads	to	extractive	means	to	secure	resources	needed	to	wage	war.	Securing	successful	
extractive	 means	 of	 creating	 violence	 entailed	 “elimination,	 neutralization,	 or	 cooptation	 of	 the	
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great	 lord’s	 local	 rivals”	 leading	 to	 the	 process	 of	 state-making	 (Tilly	 1985:	 183).	 State	 structures	
such	as	military	organizations,	war	industries,	and	schools	also	become	part	of	the	war-making	and	
state-building	process.	To	sustain	the	state	apparatus,	agents	of	the	state	ally	with	different	social	
classes,	 particularly	 the	 ruling	 class.	 The	 processes	 of	 war-making,	 state-making,	 protection	 and	
extraction	converge	to	develop	a	centralized	state	apparatus.		
Perceptions	of	Warfare			
Contemporary	 literature	 on	 war	 and	 state	 formation	 establishes	 that	 war	 and	 the	
preparation	for	war	play	critical	roles	in	the	development	of	coherent	state	institutions.	As	outlined	
above,	this	experience	confirms	the	reality	that	European	states	were	the	products	of	war.	In	other	
words,	 the	 historiography	 of	 European	 states	 acknowledges	 warfare	 as	 a	 source	 of	 change	 and	
innovation.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 case	 in	 the	 African	 context:	 “Pre-colonial	 African	 warfare-	 indeed	
enormous	 swathes	 of	 non-European	 military	 history-has	 been	 categorized	 over	 the	 last	 two	
centuries	 as	 ‘primitive’	 or	 ‘tribal’”	 (Reid	 2007:1).	The	vast	majority	of	Eurocentric	 scholarship	has	
treated	African	warfare	as	“tribal”	scrimmages	lacking	modern	techniques	and	weaponry	to	quality	
as	a	“civilized”	typology	of	warfare:	“societies	which	fight	‘primitive’	wars	are	those	which	are	held	
to	 be	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 of	 civilization,	 whose	 methods	 and	 technologies	 are	 crude,	 and	 whose	
aspirations	 and	 visions	 are	 limited	 by	 culture	 and	 environment”	 (Reid	 2007:	 2).	 The	nineteenth-
century	literature	emphasizes	the	endless	yet	meaningless	nature	of	these	primitive	wars,	fought	by	
“traditional”	and	“backward”	societies	stuck	in	unquestioned	customs	and	traditions	(Reid	2007:	2).	
This	was	 brought	 to	 a	 “blessed	 end”	 by	 the	 saving	 narrative	 of	 European	 imperialism	 (Markakis	
2011:	2).		
Such	 perceptions	 of	 pre-colonial	 African	 history	 reduce	 African	 civilizations	 to	 mere	
savagery;	this	also	serves	as	a	way	of	telling	the	African	story	that	legitimizes	colonization.	As	such,	
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African	wars	have	been	dismissed	or	regarded	as	“illegitimate”	forms	of	warfare:	“African	war	was	
seen	as	 less	the	mother	of	 invention	than	an	ongoing	process	of	wanton	destruction”	(Reid	2007:	
232).	In	the	post-decolonization	era,	the	evaluation	of	African	states	holds	the	general	assumption	
that	African	states	are	the	sheer	products	of	colonial	constructs.	Therefore,	the	Tillyan	process	of	
state-formation	 fails	 to	be	 tested	 in	 the	region	since	principal	 relationships	 that	sustain	 the	state	
are	 assumed	non-existent	on	 the	 continent.	 In	other	words,	 “Because	 state	building	 in	Europe	 is	
linked	to	the	onset	of	modernity	and	technological	progress,	practically	in	warfare,	Tilly’s	insights	
have	not	been	tested	in	Africa”	(Markakis	2011:	2).	Similar	to	the	pre-colonial	narrative	on	primitive	
African	wars,	this	has	led	to	a	complete	neglect	of	Africa	from	“scholarly	literature	on	state	creation	
and	consolidation”	(Herbst	2000:	20).	Despite	this	general	neglect,	some	studies	have	documented	
the	role	of	warfare	 in	the	rise	of	pre-colonial	states:	the	Hausa	Fulani	 in	West	Africa,	the	Zulu	in	
South	Africa	and	the	Mahdist	state	in	the	Sudan	(Markakis	2011:	2).	Similarity,	the	place	of	war	in	
the	building	of	the	Ethiopian	state	has	been	confirmed	through	some	scholarship	(Markakis	2011,	
Zewde	 1991).	 This	 paper	 seeks	 to	 apply	 Tilly’s	 assertions	 and	 the	 processes	 of	 European	 state	
formation	to	the	Ethiopian	case-study	while	also	noting	on	the	social	and	cultural	landscapes	that	
make	national	articulation	a	reality.			
Articulation	and	Cultural	Political	Economy			
	 In	order	to	understand	state-building	in	Ethiopia,	it	is	vital	to	situate	our	understanding	of	
the	extractive	political	economy	as	an	articulated	project	that	politically	and	culturally	includes	or	
excludes	certain	regions	and	actors.	In	the	process	of	state-building,	“wielders	of	coercion”	seek	to	
solidify	the	structures	of	the	state	through	linking	and	delinking	certain	places	from	the	process	of	
capital	 accumulation.	 Evaluating	 these	 geopolitical	 spaces	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 in	 the	
production	 process	 provides	 greater	 understanding	 into	 the	 ways	 states	 becomes	 politically	 and	
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socially	consolidated.	Furthermore,	the	state	is	a	product	of	socio-historical	processes	and	cultural	
landscapes	that	facilitate	state-formation.	Although	Tilly	provides	insight	into	the	place	of	war	and	
the	political	economy	of	extraction	in	institutional	building,	the	element	of	culture	is	left	out	of	the	
discussion.	In	the	field	of	political	economy,	Best	&	Paterson	(2010:	2)	note,	the	essential	aspects	of	
culture	 are	 generally	 dismissed:	 “Political	 economy,	 as	 conventionally	 understood...fails	 to	 fully	
explain	 its	object	because	 it	abstracts	political	economy	from	its	cultural	constitution.”	What	has	
caused	 this	 abstraction	 is	 explored	 through	 the	writings	 of	Karl	 Polanyi.	As	 Polanyi	 notes	 in	 his	
seminal	work,	The	Great	Transformation,	the	rise	of	the	self-regulating	market	separated	the	sphere	
of	 economics	 from	 that	 of	 politics.	 Therefore,	 contemporary	 neoliberal	 economy,	 a	 derivative	 of	
early	nineteenth	century	laissez-faire	economics,	“confronts	the	social,	political	and	cultural	realms	
as	an	autonomous	and	self-regulating	entity”	(Best	&	Paterson	2010:	2).		In	other	words,	the	fields	of	
economics	 and	 political	 economy	 tends	 to	 disarticulate	 culture	 from	 their	 own	 conceptual	
apparatus,	subordinating	socio-political	processes	to	the	decrees	of	a	liberalized	economy.	Contrary	
to	 this	 idealized	 and	 disembedded	 project,	 Tsing	 rightly	 comments,	 “all	 economic	 forms	 are	
produced	with	the	diverse	materials	of	culture”	(Tsing	2009,	158).	My	work,	therefore,	is	attentive	
to	 the	ways	 the	 imagining	of	 the	Ethiopian	 state	occurs	 amidst	 articulated	 forms	of	 the	political	
economy,	which	are	facilitated	through	social	and	cultural	realities.		
These	 social	 and	 cultural	 phenomenon	 are	 partly	 the	 products	 of	 the	 effort	 to	
institutionalize	 a	 free-market	 economy,	 what	 Polanyi	 constitutes	 as	 part	 of	 the	 liberal	 creed.2	
Polanyi	 documents	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 economy—as	 an	 extractive	 activity—on	 human	 life	 and	
nature.	 Recounting	 the	 consequences	 of	 free-market	 ideology	 on	 individuals,	 Polanyi	 notes	 the	
separation	 of	 labor	 from	 other	 human	 and	 social	 activities.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 annihilation	 of	 “all																																																									
2The	creed	consists	of	a	competitive	labor	market,	the	gold	standard,	and	international	free	trade	(Polanyi	1944:	141).		
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organic	forms	of	existence	and	to	replace	them	by	a	different	type	of	organization,	an	atomistic	and	
individualistic	one”	(Polanyi	1944:	171).	In	order	for	the	economic	world	to	function	in	accordance	
with	the	principles	of	the	free	market,	traditional	and	social	 institutions	had	to	be	destroyed	and	
native	people	forced	to	make	a	living	through	selling	their	labor	(Polanyi	1944:	163).	This	system	of	
extraction,	the	exploitive	performance	of	the	liberal	economy,	changed	the	existence	of	human	life	
through	 transforming	 a	 way	 of	 being	 and	 operating	 through	 one’s	 organic	 social	 and	 cultural	
institutions.		
Nature	 serves	 as	 another	 arena	 degraded	 by	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 economy.	 The	
commodification	 of	 nature	 allowed	 for	 the	 social	 and	 institutional	 manifestations	 of	 the	 free-
market	 economy.	 Key	 to	 this	 institutional	 performance	 was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 real-estate	
market	that	was	vital	to	the	utopian	society	proposed	by	the	liberal	creed.	Within	this	system,	land	
and	 nature	 became	 subordinated	 to	 market	 mechanism	 (Polanyi	 1944:	 187).	 Echoing	 the	 very	
themes	evident	in	the	commodification	of	human	life,	the	performance	of	the	economy	upon	land	
and	nature	called	for	the	destruction	of	the	social	and	cultural	systems	of	native	peoples	(Polanyi	
1944:	188).		Land	and	nature	were	further	subordinated	under	the	free	market	system	through	the	
commercialization	of	soil,	the	mass	production	of	food	and	raw	materials	to	serve	the	needs	of	the	
national,	 industrial	economy	and	the	opening	up	of	 international	trade	(Polanyi	 1944:	 189).	Thus,	
the	free-market	performed	its	dehumanizing	project,	detaching	and	depoliticizing	man’s	existence	
and	social	institutions.	These	processes	of	commodification	or	incorporation	into	wider	extractive	
mechanisms	 and	 markets	 and	 the	 cultural	 transformation	 that	 underlines	 these	 changes	 will	
further	be	evaluated	in	the	state-formation	processes	of	Ethiopia.			
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European	Imperialism	in	the	Horn		
During	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 area	 currently	 known	 as	 Ethiopia	 held	 a	 number	 of	 feudal	
nobilities,	kingdoms	and	principalities	(Hiwet	 1975:	 1).	Following	the	end	of	 the	Zemene	Mesafint	
(Era	of	Princes)3,	the	need	for	a	centralized	state	apparatus,	with	greater	functional	and	territorial	
reach,	 became	 apparent	 (Hiwet	 1975:	 1).	 The	 northern	 highlands	 of	 Ethiopia,	 consisting	 of	 the	
majority	Amhara	and	Tigre	ethnic	groups,	were	known	by	European	travelers	as	Abyssinia4	as	early	
as	 the	 sixteenth	century.	The	ancient	 territory	of	 the	Abyssinian	kingdom	comprised	 the	current	
provinces	of	Tigre,	Begemder,	Gojjam,	and	parts	of	Shoa	and	Wollo	(Cohen	&	Weintraub	1975:	11).	
In	 the	 Southern5	and	 southwestern	 regions	 of	 Ethiopia,	 a	 number	 of	 ethnic	 groups	 and	 Oromo	
kingdoms	 persisted	with	 varying	 levels	 of	 political	 and	 social	 organization	 and	 evolution	 (Hiwet	
1975:1).	 These	 19th	 century	 political	 and	 social	 organizations	 ranged	 from	 “primitive	 communal	
societies	 to	 states	 with	 powerful	 kings	 and	 elaborate	mechanisms	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 authority”	
(Zewde	1991:	16).	Today’s	provinces	of	Wollega,	Hararge,	Gemu	Gotta,	Bale,	Arussi,	Illubabor,	Kaffa,	
and	 Sidamo,	 as	 well	 as	 parts	 of	 Shoa	 and	 Wollo	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 larger	 Abyssinian	
kingdom,	 constituting	what	 is	 today	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 state	 (Cohen	&	Weintraub	
1975:	11).	This	internal	consolidation	and	expansion	took	place	in	parallel	with	European	expansion	
in	the	region.		
																																																								
3The	era	of	princes,	during	the	18th	and	early	19th	centuries,	indicated	a	time	of	disintegration	and	a	lack	of	central	
authority	among	the	ancient,	Christian	polity	of	Abyssinia	(c.1769-1855).	Reunification	of	these	disintegrated	political	
units	would	later	become	a	reality	under	the	rulership	of	emperors	Tewodros,	Yohannes	and	Menelik	II	(Reid	2007:	11).			
4The	term	Abyssinia	comes	from	the	name	of	a	tribe—“Habashat”—that	inhabited	the	Ethiopian	region	during	the	pre-
Christian	era	(Zewde	1991:	1).		
5The	south	or	southern	peoples	not	only	denotes	a	geographical	location;	it	also	refers	to	states	and	people	groups	who	
were	peripheralized	or	excluded	from	the	“imperial	politics	of	Gondar”	(Zewde	1991:16).		
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Imperial	contention	for	raw	materials	and	resources	began	in	earnest	in	the	Horn	with	the	
opening	 of	 the	 Suez	 Canal	 in	 1869	 (Markakis	 2011:	 94).	 In	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 laissez-faire	
capitalism	 of	 the	 industrial	 revolution	 underwent	 a	 transformation	 to	monopoly	 capitalism	 by	
which	 trade	was	controlled	or	concentrated	 in	 the	hands	of	 few	 individuals	 (Hiwet	 1975:	2).	This	
new	 phase	 of	 capitalism	 involved	 rapid	 accumulation,	 centralization	 and	 internationalization	 of	
capital,	 destruction	 of	 the	 “petty	manufacturer,”	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 stock	 exchange	 through	 the	
increase	in	the	activities	of	companies,	cartels	and	trusts	(Hiwet	1975:	2).	This	period	of	capitalist	
globalization	marked	the	“big	thinking”	and	performative	nature	of	the	free-market	economy—of	
moving	 from	 “small	 scale	 petty	 commerce	 of	 imagined	 “tradition”	 to	 large-scale	manufacturing”	
(Tsing	2009:	154).	The	greater	need	for	cheap,	raw	materials	and	agricultural	produce,	which	called	
for	a	“bigness	of	production,”	drove	the	scramble	for	colonies	by	European	powers	(Hiwet	1975:	2;	
Tsing	2009:	154).		
The	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 witnessed	 European	 imperialism	 and	 the	
international	capitalist	economy	at	the	door	of	Ethiopia’s	frontiers	(Crummey	2000:	226).	This	new	
era	marks	the	critical	moment	of	European	intervention	for	territorial	and	economic	gains	that	will	
transform	 the	 political	 economy	 and	 state-consolidation	 processes	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 state-in-the-
making.	 Although	 European	 interests	 in	 the	 region	 were	 multifaceted6 ,	 the	 main	 driver	 of	
European	scramble	in	the	region	was	economic	(Zewde	1991:	24).	African	markets	were	sought	after	
to	deal	with	the	excessive	production	of	industrial	goods	as	the	result	of	the	industrial	revolution	in	
Europe	(Zewde	 1991:	24).	 In	particular,	Britain,	France	and	Italy	were	all	determined	to	seize	raw	
goods	and	materials	from	the	Horn	(Markakis	2011:	94).		
																																																								
6Colonialist	also	had	a	civilizing	mission	to	aid	Africans	embark	on	the	path	of	“progress”	and	“modernity.”		
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European	powers	 facilitated	 this	process	of	 extraction	 through	 the	 introduction	of	 certain	
type	 of	 state	 structure.	 They	 introduced	 centralized,	 state	 infrastructures	 in	 their	 colonies	 and	
relied	 on	 taxation	 and	 commerce	 to	 generate	 revenue	 (Crummey	 2000:	 227).	 To	 the	 west,	 the	
British	 controlled	 the	 Sudan,	 to	 the	 south,	 Kenya;	 and,	 to	 the	 northeast,	 Somaliland	 (Crummey	
2000:	 226).	 Although	 the	 control	 of	 the	 headwaters	 was	 the	 principal	 driver	 of	 British	 colonial	
policy	in	the	region	(i.e.	Lake	Victoria	and	Uganda),	the	British	also	pursued	trade	along	the	Baro	
from	the	Ethiopian	port	of	Gambela	(Crummey	2000:	226).	This	changed	the	political	economy	of	
the	 region,	 leading	 to	 parts	 of	 western	 and	 southwestern	 Ethiopia	 to	 become	 highly	
commercialized;	 due	 to	 such	 changes,	 the	 province	 of	Wallaga,	 in	 particular,	 rose	 in	 economic	
importance	 (Crummey	2000:	227).	This	part	of	Ethiopia,	a	 fertile	ground	 for	 the	supply	of	highly	
demanded	 international	 products	 (i.e.	 coffee),	 would	 prove	 essential	 in	 filling	 the	 coffers	 of	 the	
central	 state	 treasury	 under	 the	 emperor’s	 control.	 Through	 their	 skilled	 diplomacy,	 the	 French	
influenced	the	court	of	Menelik	II:	winning	a	concession	to	build	a	railroad	linking	the	city	of	Addis	
Ababa	to	Djibouti	(Crummey	2000:	226-227).	Starting	in	1917	and	following	the	next	five	decades,	
the	railroad	served	as	Ethiopia's	main	source	of	commercial	trade	and	influence	(Crummey	2000:	
228).	 As	 Polanyi	 rightly	 notes,	 the	 commercialization	 of	 soil	 to	meet	 international	 demands	 for	
trade	facilitate	internal	articulation,	as	shown	through	the	Ethiopian	state-in-the-making.7				
Although	 the	 three	 imperial	 powers	 had	 competing	 objectives	 for	 colonization,	 they	were	
open	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 joint	 action,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 Tripartite	 Agreement8	signed	 by	 the	
three	colonial	powers	 (Crummey	2000:	226-227).	 	Britain's	 interest	 in	 the	Nile	Basin	and	France’s	
																																																								
7The	Impact	of	the	railroad	in	later	periods	is	further	documented	through	the	writings	of	Keller	(1988)	and	Markakis	
(2011).	
8Summary	of	principal	provisions	(Marcus	Life	and	Times,	pp.	204-12);	see	also	Shiferaw	Bekele,	“Some	Notes	on	the	
Genesis	and	Interpretation	of	the	Tripartite	Treaty,”	Journal	of	Ethiopian	Studies	18	(1985):	63-79.		
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desire	 to	 control	 the	 railway	 zone	 were	 defined	 clearly	 (Zewde	 1991:	 150-151).	 Although	 Italy’s	
intentions	 were	 shrouded	with	 vague	 language,	 the	 country	 took	 the	 largest	 claim	 amongst	 the	
other	colonial	powers:	northern	region	(Eritrea)	and	south-eastern	region	of	Ethiopia	(Somaliland).	
These	 European	 colonial	 encroachments	 posed	 existential	 threats	 to	 Ethiopia	 and	 therefore	
expanding	 the	 effective	 frontiers	 of	 the	 state	 to	 establish	 a	 buffer	 zone	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	
central	 and	 northern	 highlands	 became	 a	 key	 priority.	 This	 process	 of	 incorporation	 of	 the	
periphery	 into	 the	 larger	 Abyssinian	 kingdom	 was	 largely	 a	 response	 to	 European	 colonial	
expansion	and	the	threat	it	posed	to	Ethiopia.	The	following	sections	will	narrate	state-building	in	
the	 country	 through	 the	 interrelated	 processes	 of	 war-making,	 state-building,	 extraction	 and	
protection	as	a	Tillyan	story,	supplemented	by	discussions	on	the	social	and	cultural	landscape	that	
facilitate	national	articulation.		
Territorial	and	Cultural	Expansion			
The	 acquisition	 of	 military	 aid	 from	 external	 actors,	 facilitated	 through	 diplomatic	
maneuvering,	 was	 instrumental	 in	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	 modern	 Ethiopian	
state.	Congruent	with	the	Tillyan	perspective,	territorial	expansion	also	entailed	securing	resources	
that	proved	essential	in	building	the	Ethiopian	state.	As	European	powers	intensified	their	colonial	
assaults	 in	 the	 territories	of	 the	Horn,	Menelik	 II	was	aware	 that	Ethiopia	could	also	 fall	prey	 to	
colonization.	He	warned,	“If	Powers	at	a	distance	come	forward	to	partition	Africa	between	them,	I	
do	not	intend	to	be	an	indifferent	spectator”	(quoted	in	Hiwet	1975:	6).	As	the	only	ruling	province	
excluded	from	the	civil	wars	of	the	Era	of	Princes,	the	Shawan	dynasty	seized	the	power	basis	and	
eventually	imperial	throne	(Markakis	2011:	90).	Menelik	II	began	his	expansion	project	as	a	vassal	of	
Emperor	Yohannes	and	followed	a	pattern	of	territorial	expansion	that	marked	the	Shawan	dynasty	
(Zewde	 1991:	 60).	 The	 mid-nineteenth	 century	 saw	 the	 great	 expedition	 of	 Menelik	 II	 and	 his	
Tapestries	|	Spring	2016	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		 15	
Abyssinian	 counterparts	 to	 incorporate	 peripheral	 lands	 into	 the	 core	 Abyssinian	 empire.	 This	
brought	conquered	territories	into	the	political	economy	of	the	Ethiopian	state-in-the-making	and	
began	 the	 imposition	 of	 the	 ‘high	 culture’	 of	 the	 northern	 Abyssinian	 kingdom	 on	 conquered	
territories	(Markakis	2011:	98).		
A	 strategic	 calculation	 went	 into	 conquering	 the	 lands	 in	 the	 periphery;	 incorporated	
territories	were	 integrated	 through	different	methods	and	 to	 varying	degrees.	This	was	based	on	
the	different	 levels	of	 threat	and	benefits	 to	political	and	economic	state-consolidation.	Forms	of	
incorporation	were	judged	based	on	categories	such	as	religion,	structure	of	indigenous	subsistence	
production,	 ability	 to	 produce	 internationally	 tradable	 goods,	 and	 the	 territories	 strategic	
importance	 to	 the	 imperial	 state	 (Clapham	 2002:	 13).	 Of	 these,	 Zewde	 notes	 that	 the	 desire	 to	
control	long-distance	trade	was	probably	the	most	important	consideration	(Zewde	1991:	60).	These	
motives	prompted	Gojamites	and	the	Shewan	forces	to	secure	the	Oromo	Gibe	region:	“the	green	
and	 lush	 Oromo	 lands	 and	 their	 boundless	 commodities	 (gold,	 civet,	 ivory,	 coffee)	 and	 the	
prosperous	markets	of	Assenedbo	(whose	population	swelled	to	100,000	on	market	days),	Embabo,	
Jimma	and	Billo”	(Hiwet	1975:	4).			
The	victory	at	the	Battle	of	Embabo	(1882)	marked	a	critical	moment	for	Menelik	II	to	begin	
articulating	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 state	 internally	 and	 externally.	 He	 recognized	 the	
“external	implications	of	his	internal	expansion”	in	light	of	the	scramble	for	Africa	that	would	take	
place	shortly	after	 (Zewde	 1991:	61,	Hiwet	 1975:	6).	A	month	after	his	expedition	 in	 the	South,	he	
pronounced	 to	 the	 European	 world:	 “I	 am	 happy	 to	 be	 able	 to	 tell	 you	 that	 a	 long	 and	 hard	
campaign	of	seven	months	against	the	kingdoms...lying	to	the	south	and	west	of	my	dominions	and	
masters	of	the	route	from	Shewa	to	Kefa,	has	just	permitted	me	to	subject	and	render	tributary	the	
kings	of	Limmu,	Gomma,	Guma,	Gera,	and	the	Christian	king	of	Kafa”	(quoted	in	Hiwet	1975:6).	His	
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announcement	 to	 European	 powers	 confirmed	 the	 fixed	 borders	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 state-in-the-
making.		
The	 Battle	 of	 Embabo	 made	 the	 south-west	 region	 vulnerable	 to	 Abyssinian	 conquest	
(Zewde	 1991:	 62).	 In	 this	 process	 of	 internal	 expansion	 and	 consolidation	 of	 central	 authority,	
Menelik	eliminated	enemies	who	resisted	his	rule	or	neutralized	his	enemies	by	integrating	them	
into	the	empire	building	project.	The	Oromo	rulers	Kumsa	Moroda	(later	dajjazmach9	and	baptised	
Gabra-Egziabher10)	of	Leqa	Naqamte,	Jote	Tullu	(also	made	dajjazmach)	of	Leqa	Qellam,	Abba	Jifar	
II	 of	 Jimma,	 and	 the	 rulers	 of	 the	 other	Gibe	 river	 states,	 such	 as	 Illubabor,	 further	 to	 the	west	
surrendered	to	Menelik	with	“little	to	no	resistance”	(Zewde	1991:	62).	The	conquest	of	south-west	
Oromo	region	not	only	signified	territorial	expansion	and	consolidation	for	the	Emperor	but	also	
allowed	 the	 Emperor	 to	 secure	 economic	 gain	 that	 would	 strengthen	 his	 political	 and	 military	
power	(Zewde	1991:	62).	In	the	Southern	plateau,	Shoan	forces	met	fierce	resistance	from	the	Arsi	
Oromo.	 Arsi	 leaders	 Suffa	 Kuso	 and	 Damu	 Usu	 were	 willing	 to	 accept	 the	 offer	 of	 internal	
autonomy	 in	 return	 for	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	Menelik’s	 suzerainty.	 However,	 the	 other	 clan	
chiefs	 and	 elders	 remained	 resistant	 to	 this	 exchange,	 offering	 levies	 from	 different	 clans	 in	 the	
region	to	muster	an	army	against	Menelik’s	men	(Zewde	1991:	62).	Although	the	 fight	marked	an	
unequal	 struggle	 between	 arrows	 and	 firearms,	 the	 battles	 between	 Menelik’s	 army	 and	 Arsi	
fighters	lasted	for	four	years.	The	final	conquest	of	Arsi	opened	the	way	for	the	seizing	of	the	city-
state	and	commercial	center	of	Harar	in	1887	(Markakis	2011:	90).		
As	the	incursion	into	Harar	needed	more	sophisticated	planning	than	the	battle	at	Embabo,	
Menelik	dispatched	one	of	his	 spies,	Asme	Giyorgis,	 to	 secure	 inside	 information	needed	 for	 the	
attack.	 In	 his	 assessment	 of	 European	 state	 formation,	 Tilly	 emphasizes	 the	 establishment	 of																																																									
9The	term	is	equivalent	to	lieutenant-general			
10Translates	as	slave	of	God		
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surveillance	 systems	 and	 forms	 of	 guaranteeing	 control	 as	 key	 in	 the	 state	 building	 process.	
Disguised	as	a	Muslim	merchant,	Asme	collected	data	 for	three	months	on	the	city-state	ranging	
from	 its	 “cultural	 life,	 economic	 conditions,	 number	 of	 dwellings,	 composition	 and	 size	 of	
population”	(Hiwet	1975:	7).	Menelik	made	a	rationale	for	conquest,	relaying	to	Italy	a	proposal	for	
their	co-scramble	for	Southern	territories:	“Italy	was	to	occupy	Zeila	and	Berbera,	and	Minilik	was	
to	occupy	Harar”	(Hiwet	1975:	8).	Two	months	later,	he	expressed	his	intentions	of	annexing	all	of	
the	territory	mentioned	above	(Hiwet	1975:	8).	Menelik	led	his	men	of	20,000	against	the	emir	of	
Harar,	 commanding	 no	more	 than	 4,000	men.	 The	 victory	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	 Chelenqo,	 January	 6,	
1887,	 marked	 the	 opening	 of	 Harar	 to	 the	 exploitive	 Shewan	 domination.	 After	 securing	 the	
imperial	throne	in	1889,	Menelik	commanded	forces	from	other	Christian	provinces	to	continue	his	
Southward	 expansion.	 This	 was	 briefly	 checked	 by	 the	 Italian	 invasion	 from	 the	 north,	 which	
resulted	in	the	Battle	of	Adwa	(1896).		
Through	methods	 of	 forced	 incorporation	 and	 concessions,	 land	 in	 the	 periphery	 became	
articulated	into	the	larger	Abyssinian	kingdom.	Territorial	expansionism	was	embedded	within	the	
tripartite	 process	 of	what	Donham	 (1986:	 11)	 calls	Abyssinianization:	 rist	 land-tenure	 system,	 the	
establishment	 of	 Amharic	 as	 a	 dominant	 language	 and	 the	 proliferation	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	
Orthodox	 Christian	 Church.	 The	 latter	 two	 were	 critical	 in	 sustaining	 the	 cultural	 and	 political	
hegemony	 of	 the	 Abyssinian	 kingdom	 and	 the	 religious	 traditions	 of	 the	 northern,	 Semitic-
speaking	peoples	while	 the	 previous	 instigated	 the	 systematic	 practice	 of	 extraction.	 	The	 “Great	
Tradition”	of	 the	Abyssinian	kingdom,	as	 it	 expanded	 southward,	defined	 the	national	history	of	
Ethiopia	at	the	cost	of	the	historical,	social	and	economic	subjugation	of	colonized	areas.	The	set	of	
Abyssinian	 ideologies	 and	 attitudes,	 coupled	 with	 the	 Orthodox	 religious	 institution	 and	 the	
Amharic	 language,	 served	 a	 self-legitimizing	 purpose	 that	 defined	 the	 northern	 peoples	 as	more	
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civilized	 than	 their	 southern	 neighbors	 (Clapham	 2002:	 11).	 Having	 their	 cultures	 and	 traditions	
condemned	 to	 second	 class	 status,	 conquered	 peoples	 in	 the	 south	 could	 only	 enter	 into	 the	
political	 and	 social	 life	 of	 the	 defined	 Ethiopian	 state	 through	 adopting	 the	 lingua	 franca	 of	
Menelik’s	 empire	 and	 through	 conversion	 to	 Ethiopia	 Orthodox	 Christianity	 (Marcus	 1995:	 2).	
Furthermore,	the	Emperor	used	the	method	of	name	changes	to	Amharic	to	reinforce	Abyssinian	
hegemony.	This	forced	an	identity	on	conquered	peoples	that	would	erase	their	historical	 lineage	
and	 cultural	 traditions.	 Their	 collective	 lives	 would	 now	 become	 narrated	 through	 the	 ‘greater’	
Ethiopian	historical	narrative	that	was	only	defined	by	Abyssinian	customs	and	traditions.		
Militarization	and	Internal	Legitimacy			
	 Territorial	 and	 cultural	 expansion	 gave	 Menelik	 and	 his	 men	 the	 means	 to	 engage	 in	
external	 war	making.	 In	 the	 Tillyan	 typology,	 war-making	 involves	 the	 capacity	 to	 fight	 against	
outside	 intruders	by	 securing	 a	monopoly	 over	 the	means	of	 coercion.	 In	 the	Ethiopia	 case,	 this	
process	 was	 facilitated	 by	 Menelik	 II’s	 keen	 ability	 to	 secure	 modern	 weaponry	 from	 European	
powers.	By	playing	the	colonizing	powers	against	each	other,	Abyssinian	 leaders	secured	modern	
weaponry	 and	 ammunition	 (Markakis	 2011:	 92).	 Against	 Britain's	 arms	 embargo	 imposed	 on	
Ethiopia,	 France	 and	 Italy	 allowed	Menelik	 to	 secure	 sophisticated	 firearms.	 Ironically,	 the	 same	
rifles	and	fieldpieces	Italy	granted	to	the	Abyssinians	as	a	sign	of	cordial	friendship	would	later	be	
used	against	them	at	the	battlefield	of	Adwa	(1896).		During	the	Battle	of	Adwa,	the	Ethiopian	force	
of	 100,000	annihilated	 Italy’s	army	of	20,000	(Markakis	2011:	 3,	Hiwet	 1975:	 12).	Among	Ethiopia’s	
100,000	men,	 “80,000	were	armed	with	 rifles,	while	 there	were	nearly	9,000	cavalry	as	well	as	42	
artillery	 and	 machine-gun	 batteries”	 (Hiwet	 1975:	 12).	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 men	 carried	 all	 types	 of	
weaponry,	 ranging	 from	swords	and	 lances	 to	sabres	and	spears	 (Hiwet	 1975:	 12),	equipped	by	all	
possible	means	to	ward	off	Italian	intrusion.	The	fight	put	up	by	the	Ethiopians	was	no	“primitive”	
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warfare	but	 the	 result	 of	 state	 building:	 “Unlike	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 continent,	 European	 imperialism	
met	its	match	in	this	corner	of	Africa”	(Markakis	2011:	3).		
The	building	of	an	Ethiopian	army	was	precipitated	by	the	precarious	security	threat	posed	
by	 imperial	 powers:	 “By	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 Menelik’s	 army	 consisted	 of	
approximately	 six	 hundred	 thousand	 riflemen	 and	 innumerable	 traditionally	 armed	 warriors”	
(quoted	in	Keller	1988:	37).	Before	securing	the	throne	as	emperor	of	Ethiopia,	Menelik	also	invited	
foreign	officials,	mostly	French	and	Russians,	 to	 instruct	Ethiopian	soldiers	 in	 the	use	of	modern	
weaponry	 (Keller	 1988:	 37).	 During	 his	 rule,	 Menelik	 introduced	 two	 dominant	 features	 that	
contributed	to	the	state-making	process:	a	standing	army	and	salary	payment	for	soldiers	(quoted	
in	 Keller	 1988:	 38).	 Despite	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 emperor	 to	 professionalize	 the	 army	 in	 lieu	 of	
European	 military	 organization	 and	 strategies,	 many	 traditional	 patterns	 and	 organizations	
persisted	(Keller	1988:	38).		
Congruent	with	 Tilly’s	 core	 logic,	 this	 organizational	 feature	 of	 the	 Ethiopian-state-in-the	
making	 was	 critical	 in	 eliminating	 a	 powerful	 external	 enemy.	 Furthermore,	 Ethiopia’s	 relations	
with	European	powers	 during	 the	 time	of	Africa’s	 colonization	 and	 its	 victory	 over	 Italy	 planted	
seeds	of	 legitimization	 for	Ethiopia’s	 state-formation	process.	As	Clapham	(2002:11)	 rightly	notes,	
Ethiopia	 benefited	 from	 the	 “the	 norm	 of	 sovereignty”	 and	 gained	 a	 level	 of	 recognition	 for	
statehood	 through	displaying	 its	ability	 to	 secure	modern	weaponry	 (Clapham	2002:	 11).	 In	other	
words,	 the	 emperor’s	 ability	 to	 negotiate	 with	 European	 powers	 articulated	 the	 state	 to	 outside	
powers	and	thus,	legitimated	the	notion	of	fixed	Ethiopian	borders.	Furthermore,	there	was	a	racial	
dimension	to	the	battle	that	gave	the	victory	at	Adwa	great	significance:	“It	was	a	victory	of	blacks	
over	whites”	(Zewde	1991:	81).	As	Ethiopia	symbolized	hope	and	independence,	Blacks	all	over	the	
world	 rallied	 around	 this	 victory	 and	gained	great	 inspiration	 to	 fight	 against	white	domination.	
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The	 Ethiopian	 state	 gained	 a	 level	 of	 legitimacy	 through	 such	 Black	 solidarity.	 In	 addition,	 the	
Addis	 Abeba	 Treaty,	 signed	 after	 the	 Battle	 of	 Adwa,	 affirmed	 Ethiopia’s	 independence	 and	
territorial	sovereignty.	Through	the	treaty,	the	northern	frontiers	of	Menelik’s	empire	were	clearly	
defined	(Hiwet	1975:	12).	Through	the	process,	Ethiopia	lost	access	to	the	sea	through	the	creation	
of	the	colonial	state	of	Eritrea	(Crummey	2000:	226).		
Although	the	victory	at	Adwa	guaranteed	a	level	of	international	recognition	and	legitimacy,	
Menelik	 II	 had	 to	 think	 about	 how	 to	 further	 secure	 and	 stabilize	 his	 rule.	 In	 the	 Tillyan	
perspective,	 protection	 involves	 securing	 allies	 internally	 and	 providing	 protection	 for	 domestic	
players	and	chief	supporters	of	the	empire;	this	facilitates	the	guaranteeing	of	internal	legitimacy.	
Similar	 to	 the	 European	 experience	 of	 local	magnate	 installment	 to	 rule	 different	 provinces,	 the	
Ethiopian	example,	in	particular,	confirm	the	importance	of	indirect	rulers	in	state-consolidation.	
In	 Ethiopia,	 indirect	 rulers	 who	 occupied	 intermediate	 positions	 were	 crucial	 in	 securing	
Abyssinian	power	in	the	periphery.	While	assimilating	to	the	dominant	culture	of	the	Abyssinians,	
local	balabbats	 (indigenous	 elites	who	were	 subordinate	 to	 the	 lowest	 neftegna)	 served	 as	 social	
bridges	linking	the	imperial	state	to	local	inhabitants	(Crummey	2000:	225).	They	proved	crucial	in	
the	extraction	process	and	transferring	of	capital	to	the	centre	and	provided	a	protected	provincial	
ruling	 structure:	 “Rulers	 of	 empires	 generally	 sought	 to	 co-opt	 regional	 and	 local	 power	 holders	
without	 utterly	 transforming	 their	 bases	 of	 power,	 and	 to	 create	 a	 distinctive	 corps	 of	 royal	
servants...whose	 fate	depended	on	 that	of	 the	crown”	 (quoted	 in	Markakis	2011:	 110)	They	carried	
out	 functions	 of	 the	 state	 as	 “maintaining	 law	 and	 order,	 reporting	 crimes	 and	 apprehending	
perpetrators,	 hearing	 disputes	 and	 administering	 traditional	 justice,	 as	 well	 as	 assessing	 and	
collecting	taxes.”	(Markakis	2011:	 110)	Furthermore,	the	balabbats	were	rewarded	and	transformed	
to	a	land-owning	class	themselves;	they	also	usually	retained	a	tenth	of	the	state	tax	(Markakis	2011:	
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110).	This	allowed	them	to	secure	a	higher	status	in	the	newly	engineered	socio-economic	hierarchy	
(Markakis	1973:	364).	
For	some,	submission	to	Abyssinian	powers	 led	to	“assimilation	 into	the	Abyssinian	ruling	
class,	and	even	links	with	the	royal	household”	(Markakis	2011:95).	In	regions	such	as	Wellegga	and	
Tigray,	marriage	with	the	imperial	family	provided	the	linkage	of	indigenous	rulers	to	the	imperial	
family.	 Places	 like	 Jimma,	 which	 held	 vast	 Muslim	 population,	 were	 excluded	 from	 marriage	
prospects	 (Clapham	2002:	 13).	The	political	nature	of	marriage	prospects	 signals	 the	cultural	 and	
social	landscape	that	underlined	Abyssinian	cultural	and	religious	domination.	Menelik	used	both	
indigenous	 intermediaries	 and	 transplanted	 Abyssinians	 to	 rule	 the	 incorporated	 territories	
(Markakis	2011:	4).	Amhara	and	Tigrean	naftannas,	the	Orthodox	church	and	balabbats	(subjected	
themselves	 to	 political	 and	 cultural	 assimilation)	 aided	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	
“nation”	defined	under	predominantly	Amhara	hegemony	(Marcus	 1995:	2).	The	particular	use	of	
armed	retainers	and	churchmen	by	the	Ethiopian	state	echoes	that	of	the	European	experience.	
Taxation,	the	Gult	System	and	Slave	Trade			
A	key	 component	 of	 the	 process	 of	 state-formation	 is	 the	 process	 of	 extraction	 or	 capital	
accumulation.	 	The	extraction	process	entails	the	expansion	of	the	state’s	geographical	reach	and	
the	establishment	of	institutions	of	extraction	that	could	guarantee	the	collection	of	tax	revenue.	In	
effect,	this	process	entails	the	formation	of	a	social	contract	of	sorts.	As	such,	the	extraction	process	
is	almost	 inextricably	 linked	to	the	 legitimacy	of	the	state,	since	coercion	alone	 is	 insufficient	 for	
resource	 extraction.	 In	 Ethiopia’s	 state-building	 process,	 this	 processes	 evident	 in	 the	 areas	 of	
taxation	 and	 law.	 In	 the	 1890s,	Menelik	 II	 instituted	 several	 national	 levies,	 i.e.	 the	 agricultural	
tithe,	and	constructed	a	centralized	department	of	taxation	for	revenue	collection	throughout	the	
regions:	 “No	 longer	 could	 provincial	 administrators	 arbitrarily	 forward	 the	minimum	 acceptable	
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amount	 to	 Addis	 Ababa;	 they	 had	 now	 to	 justify	 their	 receipts	 and	 render	 a	 full	 accounting”	
(Marcus	1995:	3).	Taxes	were	commonly	levied	after	conquering	a	particular	land	and	in	preparation	
for	 an	 upcoming	 external	war.	 After	 securing	 the	 city-state	 of	Harrar,	 for	 example,	 the	 emperor	
imposed	a	compensation	cost	of	10,000	Maria	Tereza	dollars	to	be	collected	from	each	gate	of	Harar	
(Hiwet	 1975:	 8).	 	In	 the	 fight	 against	 Italy	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 the	 emperor	would	 impose	 a	
special	 tax	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 importation	 of	 100,000	 carbines	 (Markakis	 2011:	 92).	 Taxation	was	 also	
purposed	to	build	a	national	economy	that	linked	the	centralized,	state	apparatus	to	the	social	and	
commercial	developments	of	provincial	hamlets	(Marcus	1995:	3).		
After	 the	 subjugation	 of	 the	 Southern	 region	 of	 Ethiopia,	 the	 building	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	
empire	was	 further	 facilitated	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	gult	 land	 system.	 This	 system	
entailed	 “the	 parceling	 out	 of	 the	 conquered	 lands	 and	 peoples	 in	 tributary	 relationships	 to	 the	
groups	 and	 individuals	 who	 conquered	 them”	 (Crummey	 2000:	 229).	 This	 land	 tenure	 policy	
primarily	functioned	to	reward	or	to	support	Menelik’s	military	forces.	To	exploit	the	resources	of	
the	 conquered	 lands	 remained	 a	 priority,	 as	 it	 proved	 the	 only	 way	 to	 pay	 the	 soldiery	 and	 to	
maintain	 the	 imperial	 treasury	 (Markakis	 2011:	 97).	 Military	 garrisons	 or	 rifleman,	 named	
naftannas,	 were	 crucial	 in	 keeping	 peace	 and	 security	 within	 the	 newly	 colonized	 spaces.	 The	
“ethos”	of	the	gult	system	became	for	Menelik's	men	“to	eat”	the	land	(Markakis	2011:	91,	97).	The	
new	garrisons	that	occupied	the	south	were	supported	through	the	tributary	relationship	between	
the	 new	 settlers	 and	 the	 gebbars11	(Crummey	 2000:	 223).	 Furthermore,	 the	 rank	 of	 the	 garrisons	
determined	the	number	of	gebbars	they	received;	while	a	commander	might	receive	a	hundred,	a	
private	might	 get	 less	 than	 five	 (Crummey	 2000:	 223).	 Through	 such	 economic	 exploitation	 and	
																																																								
11Peasant	or	taxpayer	who	owed	labor	service	and	material	tribute	to	the	garrisons.	This	person	was	usual	the	male	head	
of	a	household	(Crummey	2000:	223)		
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social	stratification,	the	Abyssinian	rulers	defined	their	upper	class	status	and	secured	their	rule	in	
the	periphery.			
The	presence	of	ketemas	(garrison	towns)	also	became	crucial	for	the	greater	security	of	the	
Imperial	 authority	within	 the	 provincial	 regions.	 These	 garrison	 towns	were	 erected	 throughout	
Ethiopia’s	vast	territory	but	were	most	apparent	in	the	southern	regions	(Keller	1988:	39).	Menelik	
dispatched	 his	 “watchmen”	 or	 soldiers	 for	 the	 administration	 of	 conquered	 territories	 and	 to	
mitigate	any	uprisings	 in	 the	 regions	 (Keller	 1988:	 39).	Where	 these	men	were	present,	 they	also	
worked	 to	 reinforce	 Abyssinian	 cultural	 hegemony.	 Compared	 with	 the	 naftannas,	 “The	 subject	
peoples	 in	 the	 empire	were	generally	 seen	as	primitive,	without	 culture	or	 effective	government,	
and	lazy,	dirty,	and	warlike:	they	were	naked	or	dressed	in	skins;	they	were	heathen	who	needed	
the	word	of	God”	(Marcus	1975:	193).	If	a	particular	soldier	had	an	offspring	by	a	southern	woman,	
the	 northern	 wife	 would	 often	 adopt	 the	 child	 into	 her	 household	 to	 raise	 him	 in	 Abyssinian	
culture	(Marcus	1975:	194).	As	part	of	this	assimilation	process,	the	status	of	an	Oromo	woman	was	
enhanced	through	becoming	mistresses	for	a	northerner	(Marcus	1975:	 194).	These,	among	many,	
serve	as	examples	by	which	Abyssinian	culture	reinstated	its	hegemony,	relegating	all	other	peoples	
are	subordinate	and	backwards.				
Further,	 the	 army	 or	 military	 garrisons	 played	 a	 central	 role	 in	 developing	 Ethiopia’s	
centralized	 state	 apparatus	 and	 bureaucratic	 authority.	 Trusted	 generals	 were	 given	 important	
posts	 such	 as	 governor-general	 of	 different	 provinces	 (Keller	 1988:	 38).	 The	 installment	 of	 these	
men	proved	crucial	 in	securing	successful	submission	of	new	territories.	This	would	later	prove	a	
challenge	as	the	presence	of	naftannas	“blocked	the	state	access	to	local	tribute	and	the	producers’	
access	to	economic	opportunity”	(Crummey	2000:	229).	In	other	words,	the	naftannas	often	failed	
to	pass	on	 the	 large	majority	of	 the	 tributes	 received	 from	their	 tributaries,	 thereby	blocking	 the	
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transfer	of	wealth	to	the	imperial	state		(Crummey	2000:	224).	Consequently,	the	state	pursued	its	
own	land-owning	objectives	through	the	measurement	of	land	under	the	qalad	(rope)	system.	This	
made	 the	 state	 not	 only	 a	 distributor	 of	 land	 but	 also	 a	 major	 claimant	 in	 the	 process	 of	 land	
allocation.	Congruent	with	Tilly’s	 thesis,	practices	of	 revenue	collection	and	 the	gult	 land-tenure	
system	 functioned	 as	 extractive	mechanisms	 that	 facilitated	 the	 building	 of	 a	more	 centralized,	
Ethiopian	state.		
With	 the	 naftanna-gebbar	 system,	 members	 of	 the	 conquered	 people	 became	 tillers	 and	
servants	 on	 their	 own	 land.	 They	were	 forced	 to	 surrender	 their	 production	 to	 the	 soldiers,	 the	
Crown	and	The	Ethiopian	Orthodox	Church	(Lata	1999:	156).	Although	the	gult	system	did	persist	
in	the	northern	highlands	previously,	the	system	reflected	a	new	socio-economic	dimensions	that	
evidenced	“subordination	and	inferiority	of	status”	in	the	conquered	regions	(Crummey	2000:	223).	
The	nature	of	the	gult	system	was	also	transformed,	particularly	in	the	southern	regions,	through	
the	introduction	of	the	railroad	in	1917.	Two	commodities	drove	the	commercial	exports	from	the	
highlands:	 skins,	hides	and	coffee.	While	skin	and	hides	were	 the	products	of	Ethiopia’s	agrarian	
and	 pastoral	 society,	 the	 second	 was	 key	 in	 allotting	 new	 value	 and	 importance	 to	 land.	 As	
Crummey	writes,	“[Coffee]	gave	new	value	to	land	and	reinforced	efforts	by	the	state	to	break	down	
the	social	relations	which	it	had,	itself,	originally	put	in	place.”	(Crummey	2000:	230).	This	confirms	
Polanyi's	 discussion	 on	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 transformations	 produced	 by	 the	 free-market	
system.		In	places	such	as	Sidamo,	Gedeo	and	Wallaga,	coffee	growing	increased	rapidly.		Gult	was	
particularly	 converted	 from	 “direct	 appropriation	 of	 labor	 toward	 tribute	 based	 on	 agricultural	
production”	(Crummey	2000:	230).	The	railroad	itself	was	also	a	great	force	of	change.	More	lands	
were	brought	into	the	Ethiopian	empire	and	the	holders	of	the	lands	now	got	the	opportunities	to	
grow	and	to	export	coffee,	becoming	part	of	the	larger	economy	of	the	Ethiopian	empire	and	the	
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global	market.	For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	history	of	Ethiopia,	western	manufactured	products	were	
also	made	available	through	the	railroad.	This	gave	new	value	to	cash	that	previously	did	not	exist	
(Crummey	2000:	230)		
Another	 common	 form	of	 extraction	during	 this	period	was	Ethiopia’s	 involvement	 in	 the	
slave	 trade.	Menelik	 is	 noted	 in	history	 as	 “Ethiopia’s	 greatest	 slave	 entrepreneur”	 (Marcus	 1995:	
73).	 Menelik	 and	 his	 wife	 reportedly	 owned	 70,000	 slaves	 (Markakis	 2011:	 97).	 This	 was	 also	
common	among	some	of	the	indigenous	elites	who	served	as	intermediaries	on	behalf	of	the	state.	
Aba	Jiffar	of	Jimma	reportedly	had	10,000	slaves	(Markakis	2011:	97).	Menelik	led	slaving	expeditions	
(razzia)	 around	 the	 conquered	 areas.	 His	 heir	 presumptive,	 Lij	 Yasu,	 forcefully	 dragged	 about	
40,000	Dizi	slaves	to	the	city	of	Addis	Ababa;	almost	half	did	not	make	the	 journey	alive	(Zewde	
1991:	 93).	 Both	 goods	 from	 the	 south-west	 and	 slaves	were	 used	 for	 exchange	 to	 garner	modern	
weapons	(Marcus	1995:73).	
The	practices	of	extraction	were	key	in	processes	of	power	consolidation	by	the	Abyssinian	
empire.	 This	 occurred	 through	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 processes	 that	 were	 embedded	 in	
practice.	 The	 cultural	 and	 economic	 landscape	was	 transformed	 through	 an	 extractive	 economy	
that	formed	hegemonic	institutions,	which	dictated	social	class	formations.	Subordination,	cultural	
annihilation	 and	 poverty	 became	 the	 products	 of	 policies	 pursued	 in	 the	 southern	 regions	
(Crummey	 2000:	 225).	 	The	 superimposition	 of	 a	 supposedly	 ‘high’	 Abyssinian	 culture	 with	 its	
“Amharic	speech,	Christian	religion,	distinctive	dress,	and	a	refined	cuisine”	displaced	the	historical	
and	social	roots	of	its	inhabitants	(Crummey	2000:	225).	Land	alienation	and	dispossession	not	only	
created	divisions	that	intensified	ethnic	and	religious	differences.	They	also	created	class	divisions	
and	 social	 hierarchies	 based	on	property	 ownership	 and	 cultural	 superiority.	 Practice	 of	 the	gult	
land-tenure	system	and	Ethiopia’s	slave	trade	rightly	characterize	the	commodification	of	man	and	
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nature.	 This	 occurred	within	 the	 larger	 framework	 of	 a	 capitalist,	 exploitative	 economy	 brought	
upon	by	European	 imperialism	 in	 the	 region.	This	also	affected	 the	cultural	political	economy	of	
the	 Ethiopian	 state-in-the-making,	 leading	 to	 the	 internal	 colonial	 practices	 of	 the	 Abyssinian	
counterparts.							
Education	and	Centralization			
	 Tilly	notes	that	the	building	of	educational	institutions	serves	to	solidify	state	infrastructure.	
This	 is	particularly	shown	in	the	modernizing	adventures	of	Menelik	II	as	the	Emperor	strived	to	
modernize	 the	 state	 through	 the	 expansion	 of	 education.	 This	 provided	 further	 support	 for	
strengthening	the	country’s	knowledge	economy	and	undertake	the	process	of	modernization.	The	
intensified	 relations	 with	 Europe	 after	 the	 Battle	 of	 Adwa	 in	 1896	 provided	 more	 educational	
opportunities	 for	 Ethiopians	 (Zewde	 1991:	 103).	 	The	 new	 intelligentsia,	 with	 French	 as	 its	 new	
lingua	 franca,	 proved	 critical	 for	 the	 expanded	 state	 infrastructure:	 “The	 expansion	 of	 the	 state	
apparatus...made	 the	 training	of	 a	 cadre	of	officials	 imperative”	 (Zewde	 1991:	 104).	 Some	of	 these	
educated	 men	 would	 later	 serve	 as	 radical	 voices	 for	 the	 marginalized	 communities	 of	 the	
Ethiopian	 state	 (Zewde	 1991:	 104).	Missionaries	 sponsored	most	 of	 the	 first	 educated	 Ethiopians;	
men	 such	 as	 Kantiba	 (Mayor)	 Gabru	 Dasta	 of	 Gondar	 region	 and	 Onesimus	 Nasib	 of	Wallaga,	
served	 their	 respective	 peoples	 through	 increasing	 literacy	 and	 educational	 opportunities.	
Education	was	also	a	site	of	struggle	for	the	state	seeking	to	balance	both	elements	of	tradition	and	
modernity.	This	is	evidenced	through	the	introduction	of	Menelik	II	School	in	1908.	The	staff	was	
made	up	of	Egyptians	of	the	Orthodox	Coptic	Christian	Church:	“It	was	felt	that	the	Copts	would	
filter	down	to	their	pupils	a	tempered	version	of	modern	ideas”	(Zewde	1991:	108).	The	ministry	of	
education,	although	it	did	not	function	as	an	independent	entity,	developed	alongside	the	office	of	
the	archbishop	(Zewde	1991:	109).	Modern	education	provided	both	skilled	individuals	for	the	state	
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apparatus	and	facilitated	the	“dissemination	of	 ideas	and	change”	(Zewde	1991:	 109).	The	place	of	
the	Church	in	educational	institutions	was	also	a	way	to	sustain	Abyssinian	religious	tradition.	
	 According	 to	Tilly’s	argument,	war-making	and	 the	processes	of	extraction	and	protection	
facilitates	 institutional	 development	 and	 centralization.	 In	 1907,	 Menelik	 announced	 his	
consideration	to	create	cabinet	members	to	the	outside	world	(Keller	1988:	40).	Similar	to	European	
cabinet	 formation,	 Menelik	 appointed	 nine	 ministers	 in	 the	 office:	 ministers	 of	 justice,	 war,	
interior,	commerce	and	foreign	affairs,	finance,	agriculture,	public	works,	and	the	ministers	of	the	
court	 and	 of	 the	 pen	 (quoted	 in	 Keller	 1988:	 40).	 The	 minister	 of	 the	 Pen	 acted	 as	 the	
emperor’s	 	“chief	 secretary,	 archivist,	 and	 chronicler”	 (Marcus	 1975:	 228).	Menelik	 did	 not	 select	
rich	 aristocrats	 or	 prominent	 men	 to	 these	 posts;	 instead,	 he	 was	 keen	 in	 selecting	 those	 who	
displayed	loyalty	to	him	and	would	thus	strengthen	his	ultimate	authority	(Keller	1988:	40,	Marcus	
1975:	228).	Despite	his	little	reliance	on	their	expertise,	these	posts	signified	the	development	of	a	
“secularized	 central	 bureaucracy”	 (Keller	 1988:	 40).	 Both	 the	 ministers	 and	 employees	 of	 the	
ministers	were	paid	salaries	directly	from	the	emperor’s	treasury	(Keller	1988:	40).		
Menelik	 pursued	both	domestic	 control	 and	 international	 legitimacy	 through	 establishing	
important	policies	around	money	and	banking.	Ethiopia	began	to	mint	its	own	currency,	the	first	
becoming	minted	in	Paris	(Keller	1988:	40).	This	currency	did	not	gain	much	acceptance	at	home	or	
abroad	in	competition	with	the	Austrian	Maria	Theresa	dollar	(Keller	1988:	40).	Another	monetary	
policy	proposed	by	Menelik	was	the	establishment	of	a	national	bank.	Initiated	by	foreign	capital,	
the	Bank	of	Abyssinia	was	 established	 as	 an	 affiliate	 of	 the	Egyptian	bank	 (Keller	 1988:	 40).	The	
bank	was	tasked	“to	provide	banking	services	in	Ethiopia,	produce	and	issue	coins	and	notes,	set	up	
bonded	warehouses,	assume	custody	of	all	money	belonging	to	the	state,	and	receive	preferential	
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rights	to	all	state	loans”	(quoted	in	Keller	1988:	40-41).	These	financial	institutions	were	crucial	in	
centralizing	the	empire	and	garnering	control	in	the	internal	activities	of	the	state.		
	 There	were	also	other	features	of	the	state	such	as	the	building	of	railroad,	postal	services,	
telegraph	and	telephone	operations,	roads,	bridges	and	hospitals	that	began	to	articulate	the	state	
as	 an	 institution.	 These	 new	 infrastructures	 served	 to	 facilitate	 the	 extraction	 process	 from	 the	
distant	provinces	and	strengthened	the	viability	of	a	centralized	Ethiopian	state	 (Keller	 1988:	41).	
Innovations	around	communications	allowed	the	emperor	to	reinstate	“rapid	communication	with	
the	outside	world	and	facilitated	administration	and	the	dissemination	of	 information	within	the	
country”	 (Marcus	 1975:	 200).	 	Infrastructures	 such	 as	 roads	were	 vital	 for	 the	 transport	 of	 troops	
and	 administrators	 while	 also	 providing	 the	 means	 to	 transport	 capital	 and	 human	 slaves	 that	
“produced	 the	 wealth	 needed	 to	 swell	 the	 imperial	 coffers”	 (Keller	 1988:	 41).	 Most	 importantly,	
these	 innovations	provided	a	way	 for	 the	emperor	to	 legitimize	his	rule	and	secure	his	dominion	
over	the	Ethiopian	state.							
Conclusion		
	 The	Tillyan	perspective	shows	the	importance	of	war	as	the	primary	motor	for	institutional	
development.	 The	 interrelated	 processes	 of	war-making,	 state-making,	 extraction	 and	 protection	
are	key	to	state-consolidation.	Due	to	the	history	of	colonization	and	the	lack	of	“modern”	warfare	
on	the	continent,	the	predatory	theory	fails	to	be	tested	in	the	region.	The	case	study	on	Ethiopia,	
as	one	of	the	two	African	countries	to	have	escaped	colonialism,	shows	the	relevance	of	predatory	
theory	in	state	formation.	While	the	vast	historical	literature	on	Ethiopia	showcases	the	country’s	
state-formation	process,	 there	has	been	 little	 theatrical	approach	to	critically	assess	 the	country’s	
state	 development.	 Through	 the	 direct	 application	 of	 Tilly’s	 account,	 I	 follow	 the	 footsteps	 of	
Markakis	 (2011)	who	mentions	 the	 theory’s	 relevance	 in	Ethiopia.	Expanding	on	his	work,	 I	 trace	
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Tilly’s	 noted	 interrelated	 processes	 of	 war-making,	 state-making,	 extraction	 and	 protection	 to	
further	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	Ethiopian	 state-building	 experience	 during	 the	 time	 of	Menelik	 II.	
Through	the	interlinked	processes	of	war-making	and	state-making,	the	Ethiopian	state	mustered	a	
sizeable	army	to	protect	the	state	from	both	global	and	local	opposition.	Furthermore,	Abyssinian	
rulers	devised	a	scheme	to	secure	modern	weaponry	from	European	powers	used	to	defeat	Italy	and	
conquer	the	lands	in	the	periphery.				
Polanyi's	work	on	the	 implications	of	 the	 free-market,	 resulting	 in	the	commodification	of	
human	 life	 and	 nature,	 also	 sheds	 light	 to	 the	 extractive	means	 by	 which	 capital	 accumulation	
became	a	reality.	The	examples	of	the	gult	land-tenure	system,	the	introduction	of	the	railroad	and	
the	practice	of	slave	trade	serve	as	Ethiopia’s	examples	by	which	free-market	mechanism	subsumes	
pre-existing	 political	 and	 social	 life	 in	 the	 periphery.	 Furthermore,	 assessment	 of	 the	 cultural	
landscape	of	Ethiopia’s	political	economy	confirms	the	embedded	nature	of	Abyssinian	high	culture	
and	 tradition	 in	 defining	 the	 Ethiopian	 state-in-the-making.	 The	 installation	 of	 Amharic	 as	 the	
national	 lingua	 franca,	 marriages	 into	 the	 imperial	 throne,	 name	 changes	 to	 Abyssinian	
counterparts	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 Coptic	 Church	 in	 educational	 institutions	 all	 display	 the	
social	underpinnings	of	Ethiopia’s	 ‘national’	articulation.	Two	dominant	 themes,	which	appear	 in	
this	era	but	become	more	apparent	in	later	periods	of	Ethiopian	history,	are	that	of	modernization	
and	 legitimacy.	 Tracing	 these	 processes	 in	 the	 coming	 historical	 frontiers,	 after	 the	 forced	
achievement	 of	 a	more	 centralized	 Ethiopian	 structure,	 reveal	 the	many	 contradictions	 faced	 by	
country	and	the	ever-present	struggle	to	garner	both	internal	and	international	legitimacy.				
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